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In this study I argue for the following claims: First, it’s best to think of subjective
character  as  the  self-acquaintance  of  each  instance of  consciousness—its  ac-
quaintance with itself.  Second,  this entails  that all  instances of  consciousness
have some intrinsic property in virtue of which they, and not other things, bear
this acquaintance relation to themselves. And, third, this is still compatible with
physicalism as long as we accept something like in re structural universals; con-
sciousness is a real, multiply instantiable, natural universal or form, but it likely
has a highly complex, articulated structure, and “lives” only in its instances. In or-
der to make these cases, I give a characterization of subjective character that ac-
counts for the intuition that phenomenal consciousness is relational in some sense
(or involves a subject-object polarity), as well as the competing and Humean intu-
ition that one of the supposed relata, the subject-relatum, is not phenomenologic-
ally accessible. By identifying the subject with the episode or stream of con-
sciousness itself  and maintaining that consciousness is immediately self-aware
(“reflexively” aware), these competing intuitions can be reconciled. I also argue
that it is a serious confusion to identify subjective character with one’s individual-
ity or particularity.
I argue that deeper reflection on the fact that consciousness has only in-
complete self-knowledge will allow us to see that certain problems afflicting ac-
quaintance theories, like the one I defend, are not the threats to certain forms of
physicalism that they might seem to be. In particular, I briefly consider the Grain
Problem and the apparent primitive simplicity of the acquaintance relation itself
in this light.
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1 Introduction
In this study, I argue for the following claims:
First, it’s best to think of subjective character
as the self-acquaintance of each instance of con-
sciousness—its  acquaintance  with  itself.1
1 As will become clear shortly, contrary to ordinary ways of speaking,
I do not hold that persons must be the “subject relata” of acquaint-
ance relations. Rather, I hold that episodes of consciousness are, fun-
damentally, the subject relata.
Second,  this  does  indeed  entail  that  all  in-
stances of consciousness have some internal rela-
tional property (or intrinsic property) in virtue
of which they, and not other things, bear this
acquaintance relation to themselves. And, third,
this is still compatible with physicalism as long
as we accept something like in re structural uni-
versals. There is always a price, but in this case
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it’s arguably no more than the price we pay to
be scientific realists.2
To make these cases, I must consider some
important preliminaries.  I  give a characteriza-
tion  of  subjective  character  that  accounts  for
the intuition that phenomenal consciousness is
relational in some sense (or involves a subject-
object  polarity),  as  well  as  the  competing
Humean intuition that one of the supposed re-
lata, the subject-relatum, is not phenomenolo-
gically accessible. If the latter is true, it is hard
to explain how we could have immediate evid-
ence  (as  opposed  to  some  sort  of  inferential
knowledge)  of  the  existence  of  this  relational
structure—evidence we do seem to have. If we
identify the subject with the episode or stream
of consciousness itself (however we individuate
or  ontologize  these)3 and  maintain  that  con-
sciousness  is  immediately  self-aware  (“reflex-
ively” aware4), then the intuition of relationality
and the Humean intuition of the missing sub-
ject can be reconciled. 
I also argue that it is a serious confusion
to identify subjective character with one’s indi-
viduality  or  particularity.  This  will  be  con-
sidered first from a phenomenological point of
view,  in  relation  to  our  tendency  to  describe
subjective  character  in  terms of  ownership  or
“mineness”, and then from an ontological point
of  view,  in  relation  to  the  metaphysical  indi-
viduation conditions of distinct streams of con-
sciousness. 
Further, I argue that deeper reflection on
the fact that consciousness has only incomplete
self-knowledge will allow us to see that certain
problems  afflicting  acquaintance  theories,  like
the one I defend, are not the threats to certain
forms of physicalism that they might seem to
2 This is  not to imply that scientific realism entails  physicalism, of
course.
3 This is a difficult issue I will not enter into. See e.g., Dainton (2000,
2008); Strawson (2009).
4 I  will  occasionally  use  the  terms  “reflexivity”  and  “reflexive
awareness”  to  denote  just  this  characteristic  of  consciousness
(i.e., that of its always being aware of itself). It is not to be con -
fused with “reflection” in the sense of introspection.  It is  more
like  the  logical  usage  of  “reflexive” (as  in  “reflexive  relation”).
The acquaintance relation is reflexive on the domain of conscious
states, according to the view accepted here (as well as being anti-
symmetric).  But  not  everything  that  stands  in  this  relation  is
self-acquainted—episodes of consciousness are, but they are also
acquainted with sensory  qualities,  and  these  latter  are  not  ac -
quainted with anything. 
be.  In particular,  I  briefly consider the Grain
Problem5 and the apparent primitive simplicity
of the acquaintance relation itself in this light. 
Preliminary  to  all  this,  we  must  first
briefly consider the inadequacies of representa-
tionalism, and at least adumbrate some of the
motivations for the recently renewed interest in
the  idea  of  acquaintance  (see  e.g.,  Chalmers
2003;  Tye 2011, pp. 96–102;  Gertler 2011, pp.
87–128, 2012; Balog 2012; Howell 2013, chs. 3 &
4;  Goff forthcoming). I argue that, indeed, we
need to lose our fear of moving beyond reduct-
ive  naturalistic  representationalisms,  especially
in  regard  to  subjective  character.  My conclu-
sions, and in many cases arguments, are not en-
tirely new, but I attempt to cast the material in
a new light, in a spirit of synthesis.
The dialectical  structure of  this study is
somewhat circuitous. In section 2, I argue that
the most plausible representationalist theory of
consciousness  is  a  self-representationalist  one
(or “Same-Order” representationalism) because
it captures subjective character, which I view as
essential to consciousness, with the smallest the-
oretical cost. However, I argue, all forms of rep-
resentationalism  about  consciousness  are  ulti-
mately implausible. This leads to a focused dis-
cussion of the notion of subjective character in
section  3, the notion that motivates higher-or-
der  and  same-order  representationalisms.  In
that section, I argue that subjective character
should be identified with the self-manifestation
or self-appearance of consciousness. Conscious-
ness, the claim goes, appears to itself no matter
what else appears to it. This in turn allows us
to  make  sense  of  the  competing  relationality
and  Humean  “no-self”  intuitions  mentioned
above. Combining these elements from sections
2 and 3, I argue in section 4 that we should un-
derstand self-manifestation in terms of self-ac-
quaintance  rather  than  self-representation.  In
section 5, I clear up what I regard to be the not
uncommon  confusion  of  subjective  character
with individuation.  And in section  6,  I  argue
5 The Grain Problem, customarily attributed to Wilfred Sellars, is a prob-
lem for any identity theory according to which sensory qualities are
really brain properties of some sort. Roughly put, the problem is that
brain properties are complex and structured while sensory qualities seem,
on the face of it, ultimately simple and unstructured. For good discus-
sions with references to Sellars see Clark (1989) and Lockwood (1993).
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that though the view espoused here implies that
being conscious is a matter of having certain in-
trinsic properties, this is compatible with a cer-
tain  type  of  physicalistically  acceptable  hylo-
morphism—the  view  that  complex  kinds  of
physical objects, properties, or processes involve
the concrete instantiation of real structures and
cannot  be  properly  understood  in  abstraction
from such a “marriage” of form and matter. 
2 Representationalisms: From first-order 
to same-order
In the theory of consciousness, the term “repres-
entationalism” has, aptly but somewhat confus-
ingly from a historical point of view, come to des-
ignate any view according to which being phe-
nomenally conscious is equivalent to representing
the right sort of things in the right sort of way.
There  is,  of  course,  much  internecine  disagree-
ment over these things and ways, but the main
idea is simple and attractive enough. If we could
understand consciousness in terms of representa-
tion and representation in terms of some natural-
istically acceptable relations, then we could “nat-
uralize”  consciousness.  I’ll  call  representational-
isms that are coupled with naturalistic theories of
content reductive representationalisms. 
Representationalisms  are  typically  divided
up into various “orders.” These orders have, in a
way, to do with the kind of content (or object) a
conscious representational state supposedly must
have. For First-Order (F) representationalisms the
relevant states are, fundamentally, just directed at
worldly objects and properties (typically the sens-
ible properties of tables, chairs, etc., see, e.g., Tye
1995, 2000; Dretske 1995). For Higher-Order (H)
representationalisms, the states must be directed
at  mental  states  of  “lower-order”—possibly but
not  necessarily  first-order  (see  e.g.,  Rosenthal
2005; Lycan 1996). For Same-Order (S) represent-
ationalisms,  the  representational  state  must  be
directed at itself (or, perhaps, some part of itself,
or a whole of which it is a part, or another part of
the whole of which it is a part).6 I also add Priv-
6 See  e.g.,  Gennaro (2012);  Kriegel (2006,  2009);  Weisberg (2008,
2014).  Williford (2006) can be taken to express a pure S view—the
conscious mental state has itself for its own object, not some portion
of itself. We can also classify Carruthers as an S theorist; see  Car-
ruthers (2000,  2005). Gennaro would not describe himself as an S
ileged-Object  (P) representationalisms as a dis-
tinct category. For these, the state must be direc-
ted at some special type of entity—a model of the
organism  as  a  representational  or  embodied
homeostatic system, a “proto-self” or, less natur-
alistically,  perhaps  an  enduring  substantial  ego
entity.7
There is, however, no obvious reason why
there  could  not  be  unconscious  representations
with  any  of  these  contents.  And,  generally,  it
seems implausible that something could be con-
scious in virtue of representing a certain type of
object—this is Alvin Goldman’s so-called “Prob-
lem of the Rock” (thinking about or seeing rocks
does not make them conscious, so why should it
make anything else conscious?), which seems to
apply to H, S, and P theories—but see below (see
e.g., Goldman 1993; Gennaro 2005; Lycan ms). 
For F theories, since it is admitted there can
be  conscious  and  unconscious  states  with  the
same  sort  of  content,  another  distinguisher
between conscious and unconscious mental states
will have to be found. For F theorists, this has
typically been a functional constraint placed on
the representations (e.g., poise, feeding into the
mind-reading system, becoming available to the
global  workspace,  see,  e.g.,  Tye 2000 and  re-
latedly  Baars 1997;  Dehaene & Naccache 2001),
sometimes coupled with the necessary condition
that the properties represented must be represen-
ted in a “non-conceptual” way (whatever that is
taken to amount to).8 For the H theorists, it has
been a somewhat different story.
H  theorists  are  generally  motivated  by  a
phenomenological inadequacy they see in F the-
theorist. S theory is also often called self-representationalism.
7 For naturalistic versions, see e.g., Damasio (1999 and 2010), Metzinger
(2004), and  Sebastian (forthcoming).  I am sure that Damasio, Met-
zinger, and Sebastian would reject this label, but the point of it is that
all these theories identify subjective consciousness, in one way or another,
with the representation of a “self,” understood in a naturalistically ac-
ceptable sense. See e.g., Metzinger (2004), p. 302: “In short, a self-model
is a model of the very representational system that is currently activating
it within itself” (emphasis original); and  Damasio (2010), p. 180: “…
[T]he brain constructs consciousness by generating a self process within
an awake mind. The essence of the self is a focusing of the mind on the
material organism that it inhabits.” It should be noted that Metzinger al-
lows that there could be conscious experience that does not involve sub-
jective character (see Metzinger 2004, pp. 559-560). Thus my categoriza-
tion here applies at most only to his theory of subjective consciousness.
Since, for me (as for Damasio), all consciousness necessarily has subject-
ive character, this difference in detail will not loom large in what follows.
8 See the excellent discussion of the “non-conceptual content” literat-
ure in Hopp (2011).
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ory.  F  theorists  generally  stress  the  so-called
“Transparency Intuition”—the idea, roughly put,
that first-order consciousness reveals only proper-
ties and objects in the world and nothing directly
about consciousness  itself,  the perceiving mind,
the subject, or the vehicles of representation (see
e.g.,  Harman 1990;  Tye 2000;  Byrne 2001).  H
theorists, on the other hand, are with varying de-
grees  of  explicitness  motivated  by  the  equally
powerful  intuition  that  consciousness  involves
some sort of “for-me-ness” or “to-me-ness,” often
termed “subjective character” (see e.g., Rosenthal
1986, p. 345 and Gennaro 2006. See also Levine
2001, pp. 104–111). This gets encoded in the H
mantra that the conscious states are just those
that one is “Aware of Being In”, those that one is
aware that one is oneself in (see e.g., the “Intro-
duction”  to  Kriegel &  Williford 2006).  The
thought is that F theory simply does not capture
that intuition. F theorists and their fellow travel-
ers  would  consider  such  “essentially  indexical”
contents or the “sense of self”  to be more ad-
vanced cognitive  products  or  artifacts  of  social
cognition, certainly not in the very ground floor
of  consciousness  (see  e.g.,  Edelman &  Tononi
2000, pp. 103–104 and Macphail 1998, pp. 2–5). 
There is here an important bifurcation in in-
tuitions  about  consciousness.  Some  significant
percentage of us thinks that subjective character
(however we ultimately understand it) is essential
to consciousness, is in the ground floor. And some
significant percentage of us thinks that it is not;
that somehow qualitative character (perhaps un-
derstood as having the right sort of representa-
tional  content)  is  essential  but  that  subjective
character is derived, secondary, or tertiary. This
bifurcation shows up in neuroscientific and psy-
chological thinking on consciousness as well.9 We
will briefly return to the significance of this bi-
furcation point in the next section. 
The H theorist has a few options about
the exact content of the H representation, the
higher-order thought (or perception [or global
state]).10 There  are  serious  and  well-known
9 For example, Tononi & Koch (2008, pp. 240–241) do not seem to
think that the “sense of self” is essential (though  Tononi (2014)
may have recently changed his view); Damasio (1999, 2010) is in
the opposing camp; see also Northoff (2013). 
10 I’ll not go into the Higher-Order Thought vs. Higher-Order Percep-
tion debate. See e.g., Gennaro (2012).
problems here.  If  the represented lower-order
state  (L  state)  of,  say,  visual  perceptual
awareness were different from the representing
H state in terms of  relevant content (e.g.,  if
the one represents a phenomenally green ball
and the other a phenomenally red one), what
would  we  consciously  see?  “Red.  No,  green.
No, red…” This is the Problem of the Division
of  Phenomenal  Labor,  or  mirepresentation
problem, as I will sometimes call it, and is re-
lated to deep and probably insoluble problems
about the epistemology of  introspection that
are pertinent to such models (of both H and S
varieties).11 If the L state simply did not exist,
would your conscious experience in that case
be a sort of Meinongian hallucination? This is
the Problem of Targetless H States.12 
To take up the latter problem just a bit,
if  one  takes  literally  much  of  the  talk  one
finds  in  the  literature  on  H  theory,  the  H
thought is supposed to make the L state con-
scious. Being conscious is a kind of extrinsic
(external relational) property of the L state, a
property it has in virtue of its being represen-
ted by the H state. Thus, if there is such an H
state, it does confer at least a relational prop-
erty  (the  property  of  “being  made conscious
by the H state”) on the L state. In the cases
in which the L state does not exist but the H
state  directed  at  it  does,  some  non-existent
object, the L state, is made conscious by an H
state. Thus the L state would literally have a
relational property; it would stand in a rela-
tion, even though it does not exist. This lit-
eral  interpretation  of  the  view  entails  some
form of Meinongianism (at least about non-ex-
istent  L  states)  and  that  you  can  seem  to
yourself  to  be  conscious  when  you  are  not.
Thus, presumably, it  should not be taken so
literally.13
11 See e.g.,  Neander (1998);  Horgan &  Kriegel (2007);  Weisberg (2008);
Tye (2011, pp. 4–8). See Kidd (ms) for an excellent discussion of these
epistemological issues in the (not interestingly different) case of S theory.
12 See Mandik (2009 and forthcoming) on the “Unicorn problem” and
Block (2011). See Rosenthal (2011,  2012);  Weisberg (2011a, 2011b);
Kiefer (2012);  Wilberg (2010), and  Berger (2013) for discussions of
various  strategies  for dealing  with Higher-Order-Thoughts  (HOTs)
without Lower-Order-Thoughts (LOTs). 
13 What I am calling the “non-literal” interpretation is, in effect, the
position in Berger (2013). And in Rosenthal (2011, p. 436) he in ef-
fect claims that the non-literal position (as I am calling it) has al-
ways been his view. See Mandik (forthcoming) on this. 
Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 4 | 27
www.open-mind.net
The non-literal interpretation, however, is
inimical to one of the reductive pretensions of
the  H strategy.  It’s  not  inimical  to  reductive
representationalism as such. But it does draw in
to  question  the  idea  that  a  reductive  theory
must construe the property of being conscious
as an external-relational property of otherwise
unconscious mental states (see Rosenthal 1997).
Thus, it could only be in virtue of the specific
content or structure of the H state itself that
there is consciousness. One would then be put-
ting  forth  the  presumably  phenomenologically
motivated  a posteriori  identity hypothesis that
the  conscious  representational  states  are  just
the ones with that content. There may be differ-
ences over the specific content (e.g., Is it about
some of  my other  mental  states,  or is  it  just
about the non-mental objects and properties of
the world?) and differences over other criteria
(e.g.,  poise);  but otherwise,  on the non-literal
interpretation, H theory is structurally just like
F theory. We can of course wed either of these
to a reductive theory of representation, but this
will  only  make  “being  conscious”  into  an  ex-
ternal-relational property to the extent that the
theory of representation adopted makes all rep-
resentation an external-relational matter. 
If one is still conscious when the L state
does not exist, then the H state would seem to
be  doing  all  the  work.  And  that’s  what  we
should focus our explanatory efforts on. What
could be special about it? Again, putting aside
other  types  of  external  relations  (e.g.,  being
available to the global workspace), it must have
a special sort of content. But it is not in virtue
of being represented that a state could be con-
scious.  Rather,  on  this  non-literal  interpreta-
tion, it is in virtue of being a representation of
X (where X is a special object of some sort, e.g.,
oneself being in a state) or that p (where p is a
proposition  with  a  special  content)  that  the
state  is  conscious;  and  we  can,  as  with  any
other sort of contentful state, try to figure out
how different naturalistic theories of representa-
tion would construe states with that content.
Whatever  theory  of  content  we  adopt,
we’ll want to know what salient or interesting
properties, from an explanatory point of view,
such representations have. What is it about you
that you can represent yourself  as being in  a
state or that a conscious state of yours is occur-
ring now? Find that out, the promise goes, and
we will understand consciousness. But, I would
argue, none of the theories of representation we
have to go on tell us anything very significant
about such states. The beaver’s tail splash, says
Millikan, to take one sort of example, can rep-
resent the very time at which it occurs (among
other things;  Millikan 1995, p. 98).  This does
not make it conscious. This particular example
applies  directly  to  Same-Order  theories,  but
surely the beaver’s tail splash could have repres-
ented a previous tail splash and its content or
its simultaneous front paw splash, etc., but that
would  not  in  itself  make  anything  conscious
either, right? 
Naturalistic theories of representation will
not  themselves  tell  us  anything  that  interest-
ingly distinguishes H states (or S states) from F
states (or P states  for that matter).  In every
case (F, H, S, P), it is just a matter of some
physical  representational  vehicles  standing  in
some set of external (or externally mediated) re-
lations to other physical objects (and sometimes
to themselves). From this point of view, we see
nothing that interestingly distinguishes the the-
ories.
Moved  by  these  problems,  H  theorists
might try to go the “essential indexical” route
(cf.  Weisberg 2012).  After  all,  on  Rosenthal’s
original  formulation,  the  conscious  states  are
those one is aware of  oneself as being in. But
here they are faced with a difficult  choice.  If
they  presuppose  a  teleosemantic  theory,  then
they have to face the fact that on this theory
there  are  no  literally  essential indexicals  (see
e.g., Millikan 1990). Change the relevant history
and other external relations and you change the
content—now an indexical, now a proper name,
now a substance term, etc. If they abandon tele-
osemantics, they could go back down some Fre-
gean rabbit hole.14 That way lies murk or per-
haps  triviality  (see  Cappelen &  Dever 2013).
But it seems inadequate just to postulate that
14 I assume here but will  not argue that teleosemantics  is  the  most
plausible naturalistic theory of content. There may be other natural-
istic options that allow one to make good sense of the notion of es-
sential indexicality in a way that could help H theory here, but I
doubt it.
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the H state contains a definite description that
happens to pick oneself out. Thus the H theorist
might be led to consider what is in effect a P
theory. One then tries to find a suitable entity
to play the role of the privileged object (a priv-
ileged signified, if you will): the proto-self, the
self-model, or what have you.15
It is hard to see how any of these possible
objects would somehow help us to make sense of
subjective character. And it is hard to see how
representing some special object could be that
in virtue of which something is conscious. If “es-
sentially indexical” content is either explicable
in terms of something more basic (as seems to
be the case to me), or impossible (as on teleose-
mantics), or metaphysically fraught in an ulti-
mately un-illuminating way, then it seems like
the best bet is to adopt a version of S theory. 
For  one  thing,  we can reduce  the meta-
physical load that threatens to plague the no-
tion of essential indexicality and solve the non-
existence  problem at  once.16 All  we  need  are
token mental states representing themselves. As
a corollary, we can give a deflationary account
of “essentially indexical” content in token-reflex-
ive terms17 that is potentially compatible with
teleosemantics  (or  whatever  non-Fregean  ac-
count one prefers) and find some other way to
capture the grain of truth reflected in the opa-
city arguments presented by Castañeda, Lewis,
and Perry.18 In my view, anyone committed to
the  intuition  motivating  H  theory  should  be-
come an S theorist, if for no other reason than
because  of  the  non-existent  L  state  problem.
The  other  possible  solutions  (e.g.,  Gennaro’s
“WIV”) introduce a kind of theoretical ineleg-
ance that renders them less plausible. 
H  theories  are  better  than  F  theories,
given  my intuitions  anyway,  because  they en-
15 See Sebastian (forthcoming) for a Damasio-inspired turn toward a P
theory (at least, that was my interpretation of it).
16 We can’t eliminate the misrepresentation problem, however. But we
bracket that for now. See Kidd (ms) and Weisberg (2008).
17 A la  Higginbotham (2003 and  2010)  and before  that  (implicitly)
Smullyan (1984); see Cappelen & Dever (2013, pp. 160-161). The hy-
perset model in Williford (2006) is the skeleton of such a theory. See
also Kapitan (2006).
18 See Cappelen & Dever (2013, ch. 10). They attempt to capture this
grain by appealing to relatively un-puzzling epistemic limitations. I
believe they are on the right track, even if I would characterize the
specific limitations in question a bit differently (see the discussion
below on our ignorance of what fundamentally individuates us). 
code the essentiality of subjective character to
consciousness. If that intuition is good then, of
the two classes, H theories are the better ones.
But  H  theories  face  the  non-existent  L  state
problem. To solve it, they must either embrace
murk or metaphysical baggage (if they go in the
direction of some P theories),  or embrace the
postulation of certain epicycles, or go same or-
der. S, in my view, is evidently the best option
for the representationalist.
S theory avoids  ad hoc moves, better re-
flects  the clarified phenomenological  intuitions
that are the real motivation, can ground a the-
ory of indexicals, and does not commit one to
an enduring self-entity of any sort; nor does it
seem to attempt to get subjective character out
of something’s representation of something else
that is structurally similar to itself, as this last
move runs  afoul  of  the  Fichte-Shoemaker  Re-
gress.19 S theory evidently does not fall prey to
the non-existent L state problem, even if it does
not avoid the misrepresentation problem. In the
end, however, it is itself  nothing more than a
type of P theory. The Privileged Object is just
the  token  mental  state  (or  episode)  itself.
Clearly,  there  is  no  self-evident  reason  why
something’s  representing  itself  should  make  it
conscious, even if it is in fact true that all con-
scious episodes do represent themselves. 
We surely  cannot  seriously  imagine  that
consciousness emanates from a special object it
needs to look at, even if that object is just the
current  experiential  time-slice  itself.  Further,
something’s representation of itself, naturalistic-
ally understood, is no more theoretically inter-
19 See  Henrich (1982);  Frank (2002,  2007);  Shoemaker (1968). The is-
sue, which is part of the “essential indexical” problematic, is, when
put into a “self-model theory” context (which is not to be identified
with Metzinger’s views), just that modeling something structurally
isomorphic to oneself is not sufficient for knowledge that one is mod-
eling oneself, as opposed to having behavioral control through such
an interface (I could be controlling my doppelgänger unwittingly and
just as effectively). One would need to know that the thing modeled
is oneself (and not something else that happens to be isomorphic to
it, like one’s counterpart in a close possible world). One cannot, on
pain of regress, derive such knowledge from a set of descriptions of
oneself without already knowing that at least one of the descriptions
does indeed apply to oneself.  So one must have some direct self-
knowledge, such as knowledge by acquaintance that one is the relev-
ant so-and-so. An S theory wedded to a teleosemantic theory of rep-
resentation and externalist theory of justification has the advantage
of being able to accommodate direct reference and non-inferential
knowledge of oneself, though one will regard this as a mere simulac-
rum of the phenomenology.
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esting (or even surprising) than its representa-
tion of the world or of one’s other thoughts and
perceptions. Thus, that does not,  a priori, ap-
pear to be the sort of thing that would be more
likely  to  be  equivalent  to  consciousness  than
something’s  representation  of  something  else.
Perhaps  adding  functional  constraints  would
help here but no more than it might help H or
F theory. 
Even if it is true that all conscious states
are  self-representational,  it  is,  of  course,  far
from clear how that fact should help us explain
consciousness. The same can be said for H the-
ory and other P theories. Rather, in all these
accounts, we are merely trying to isolate what
we take the unique content of consciousness to
be and then to apply our theory of representa-
tion to states with such content. Absent some
strong phenomenological intuitions to the con-
trary,  the  conscious  mental  states,  it  seems,
might well have been all and only those states
in  which  dogs  are  represented.  In  the  end,
though,  all  “normal”  physicalists  (i.e.,  those
who  reject  Russellian  Monism,  Panpsychism,
and Pan-proto-psychism) are reduced to  some
such strategy. All “normal” physicalists, repres-
entationalist or not, will identify consciousness
with something that is not a priori known to be
equivalent to it. We return briefly to this famil-
iar problematic at the end.
But, perhaps most alarmingly, reductive S
theories  (and  H  theories,  and  everything  in
between) are either subject to a version of the
old  Swampman  objection  or  otherwise  unten-
able.20 Since  the  conscious  states  are,  on  the
theory, just special representational states, they
are subject to the constraints of the underlying
theory of  representation (in this  case,  teleose-
mantics). If they don’t have the right history,
then they don’t have the right content. And if
they don’t have the right content, they are not
conscious. Surely there is something simply ab-
surd about the idea that one might or might
not be conscious depending on how one’s atoms
happened to get into the current arrangement.
20 See e.g., Tye (2000, ch. 6). I will not be able to go into the back and
forth over Swampman. Suffice it to say that despite hearing many
attempted rejoinders over the years, I still find the objection to be a
reductio of  representationalist  theories  of  consciousness  wedded to
historico-externalist theories of content. 
It is not that one cannot concoct a response to
the objection;  it  is,  rather,  just the very fact
that the view invites such objections in the first
place. It demands a rather serious and ugly epi-
cycle; and that counts strongly against it. But if
we reject teleosemantics and adopt an internal-
ist theory so as to escape from Swampman, we
face equally difficult problems that we cannot,
unfortunately, go into here.21 
The view then is that H theories are bet-
ter  than  F  theories  on  phenomenological
grounds and that S theories are better than H
theories  on  dialectical  and phenomenological
grounds. But all versions wedded to naturalistic
historico-externalist  theories  of  representation
are  shipwrecked  on  the  Swampman  problem,
and internalist versions face other equally diffi-
cult problems. What then shall we do? 
We  might  consider  trying  out  a  non-re-
ductive representationalist version of S theory.
This is a possibility we will return to in section
4. But first we need to reflect a bit on what H,
S, and P theories are trying to capture in the
first  place.  What  is  the  phenomenological
datum  designated  by  this  phrase  “subjective
character,” and why is it that F (and related)
theorists don’t see it as essential to conscious-
ness, while H, S, and some other theorists do?
3 Subjective character
Subjective character is often described as a cer-
tain “for-me-ness,” “mineness,” or even “me-ish-
ness” that is phenomenologically manifest and,
presumably, always accompanying, even if in a
muted or  background form,  any consciousness
whatsoever (see e.g., Zahavi 2005; Levine 2001;
Kriegel 2009 and  Block 1995).  F  and  related
theorists point out that it also seems that one
can become so absorbed in one’s actions, at one
extreme,  and  perhaps  so  dulled  at  the  other
that  one  loses  all  sense  of  oneself  (see  e.g.,
Tononi &  Koch 2008, pp. 240–241). Moreover,
they might argue that it does not seem reason-
able  to suppose  that  worms and bees  have a
21 See e.g.,  Carruthers (2000,  2005) and  Gennaro (2012,  pp.  45–
49).  Briefly,  the  sort  of  functional  role  semantics  Carruthers
embraces  derives  actual,  occurrent  content  from  dispositions,
and  it  is  actually  subject  to  variations  on  the  Swampman
theme.
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sense of self at all, and yet they may be con-
scious. A common reply from the defenders of
subjective character to the first claim is that we
are  not  talking  about  focusing  on  oneself  or
one’s current mental state as an object of atten-
tion or concern, and that, if they tried harder,
F theorists would realize that even in the most
dulled  or,  at  the  other  pole,  absorbed  state,
they are still aware at some level of themselves
(or the very experiential state they are in). To
the second objection, the typical reply is that
the  sort  of  subjective  character  we  are  en-
visaging does not require the sort of conceptual
sophistication  or  reflective  capabilities  that
would make it impossible for dogs (or even bees
and worms) to count as conscious beings (see
e.g., Gennaro 2012, chs. 7 & 8). Of course, the
replies  can be replied to, and so on. And we
won’t enter into these debates here. Suffice it to
say that, unsurprisingly, those who think that
subjective character is essential to consciousness
have ways of answering objections,  just as do
those  who deny its  essentiality.  As  commonly
happens, the answers drive us back to questions
that are themselves at least as hard to settle as
the ones we began with. Moreover, appeals to
the neuroscientific  and psychological  literature
in the attempt to decide these issues sometimes
get what plausibility they have from interpreta-
tions of the experiments and results that are as
questionable as the claims they are supposed to
support. 
My view here is that one should follow the
modeling path inspired by one’s “phenomenolo-
gical muse” and give up fighting phenomenolo-
gical intuition wars. If you find subjective charac-
ter to be essential, develop models of conscious-
ness that encode that, and see where they lead. If
you don’t find it essential but find other things to
be more important (multimodal information in-
tegration or availability in the global workspace
or whatever), model those. And let’s not forget
that we might all be working on different parts of
the same elephant, so perhaps we will be able to
combine models fruitfully one day. Eventually we
may have ways of more or less decisively testing
the different models.22
22 See  Kriegel (2007) for an excellent discussion of phenomenological im-
passes. Thanks to Jennifer Windt for reminding me of this lucid article.
Different intuitions about what is essential
to a phenomenon drive different models of the
phenomenon.  As  long  as  enough  people  (and
don’t ask for a number) share one’s phenomeno-
logical  intuitions,  one’s  project  won’t  be,  we
hope, insane or unmotivated. In regard to the
present bifurcation point, many otherwise sane,
rigorous,  and careful  thinkers  in  many widely
distributed traditions and disciplines have had
some version of the intuition that consciousness,
somehow, involves a sense of self or sense of it-
self.23 
Now, how should we characterize subject-
ive character at the phenomenological level? It
does not add much to say that it is a “sense of
self.” What sort of a sense of self are we talking
about? To say that it is “mineness” or “for-me-
ness” makes it seem as though we are talking
about the ownership of experiences. But this is
probably just  a  certain analogy based on the
ownership of property. Yes, for all that matters
here, it may well be the case that, always, if I
am in a position to know, without having to ob-
serve any behavior, that  there is a pain in the
room, then I am in a position to know that it is
my  own pain in the room. But it does not do
much good to say that “me-ishness” or “mine-
ness” adheres to my experiences like a property
or haecceity. It is not as if I just see that my ex-
periences have Willifordhood instead of Zahavi-
hood  or  Gallagherhood,  and  thereby  know
whose are whose—like distinguishing two other-
wise  qualitatively  identical  coats  by  different
name tags on the inner pockets. 
Note that looking for a special property of
the experience is not that different from seeking
out its relation to a special object (its owner or
The Self) that one may be directly acquainted
with. In both cases we are looking for a special
something  that  individuates  the  experience.
There is no interesting difference here between a
special  unique  property  that  only  my experi-
ences have and a special  unique self-object to
which they all relate.
23 For just a few examples of the historical pedigree here, see  Caston
(2002) on Aristotle, Williams (2000) and Coseru (2012, ch. 8) on the
Indian and Buddhist debate, Thiel (2011) on the early modern prob-
lematic, Frank (2004) on the German Idealist and Romantic discus-
sion, and  Zahavi (1999 and  2006) on the Phenomenological move-
ment. 
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Subjective character  should probably not
be thought of as a matter of a constant relation
to a self-object or as a special property of mine-
ness  or  me-ishness  that  all  experiences  come
with, all the more is this so if it is possible to
misattribute  ownership  to  certain  sensations.24
The first-personal dimension (Zahavi), the sense
of self in the act of knowing (Damasio), for-me-
ness,  me-ishness  (Block),  ipseity,  être-pour-soi
(Sartre),  Selbstvertrautheit, and  so  on—these
are all suggestive names for the phenomenon in
question. But we’d like to know if there is not
an  at  least  somewhat  less  ambiguous  way  of
characterizing it.
One name for it that I do rather like de-
pends on a grammatical  analogy that  can be
fleshed  out  a  bit  more.  Every  experience,  we
may say, involves the appearance  of  something
to something (or someone). The former can be
called  the  genitive  of  manifestation (appear-
ance-of), the latter the  dative of manifestation
(appearance-to).25 The genitive of manifestation
corresponds to the intentionality of  conscious-
ness—its directedness at objects; the dative of
manifestation corresponds to subjective charac-
ter.  The  identification  of  subjective  character
and the dative of manifestation may not at first
be so obvious. 
The primary intuition here is that there is
no such thing as the mere non-relational phe-
nomenal appearance of an object or quality. Ob-
jects  and  qualities  don’t  just  phenomenally
manifest—full stop. Rather, anything that phe-
nomenally  appears,  appears  to  someone  or
something  (cf.  Strawson 2011,  pp.  41–46).  If
this were false, phenomenal consciousness would
be more like a monadic property of its objects
than like a relation between a subject and an
object  of  some sort  (see  Butchvarov 1979,  p.
250). The idea that consciousness could be phe-
nomenally manifest  but manifest  to no one is
24 See e.g.,  Lane &  Liang (2011). (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer
for pointing this nice article out to me.) If, as I shall argue, subject-
ive character is not fundamentally a representational matter at all,
the issue of representational immunity to error through misidentifica-
tion is orthogonal. To the extent that the attribution of ownership is
a representational matter, it may or may not be possible to misat-
tribute ownership, as far as the view defended here is concerned. 
25 The terminology apparently derives from Prufer (1975) and is very
common  in  phenomenological  quarters.  See  e.g.,  Zahavi (1999);
Crowell (2011, p. 16). 
either incoherent or, at best, strains credulity.
Yet this seems to be exactly what F and related
theorists  are  committed  to—aches  and  pains
that  can  appear  (be  phenomenally  conscious)
but appear to no one.
If we accept that there is a dative of mani-
festation, that objects and qualities appear  to
someone or something, we are closer to but not
quite up to subjective character just yet. Sub-
jective character, recall, is supposed to be some-
thing  phenomenologically  detectable.  And  one
might raise the following sort of worry. Suppose
phenomenally  manifest  objects  and  properties
are manifest  to something or someone. It does
not follow from this alone that that  to which
they  are  manifest  is  itself  manifest  or  even
manifestable.  Nor does it follow that the  fact
that they are manifest to something is manifest
or  even  manifestable.  In  other  words,  there
could indeed be a dative of manifestation and
yet no direct phenomenological evidence of this
at all. In fact, Hume’s famous failure to find his
own self and Moore’s similar but more tentative
musings on this issue can be taken as expres-
sions of the intuition that we do not find a dis-
tinct  subject  relatum  in  experience.26 And
surely it is true that we do not find a little ubi-
quitous  homunculus—the  constant  and  ever-
present thing Hume might have been seeking,
like the little face at the bottom of old first-per-
son video games like Quake—to which all our
experiences relate—nor do we find a self-haec-
ceity  forever  re-instantiated  by  our  conscious
episodes. 
There  is,  however,  this  strong  intuition
that  phenomenal  consciousness  is  relational,
that it  involves a subject-object polarity. And
the strong intuition that we do not find any en-
tity or special criterial property that could be a
self-entity,  me-haecceity,  me-ish quale,  or  sub-
ject-relatum is  in some apparent  tension with
this intuition of relationality. Moreover, a  hid-
den subject-relatum would not account for the
phenomenology  of  subjective  character,  evid-
ently. There is a real question here. How is it
that consciousness seems to have a subject-ob-
ject  relational  structure,  and  yet  we  do  not
26 See Moore (1910); Butchvarov (1979, p. 250, 1998, p. 55), and Willi-
ford (2004). On Hume in this regard, see Strawson (2011).
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seem to be able to find the subject-relatum, one
of the relata of the relation? Isn’t it the case
that if  something non-inferentially seems rela-
tional, then we are non-inferentially aware of its
(at least) apparent relata? Speaking naïvely and
barring certain irrelevant counterexamples, if I
see that the cup is on the table, don’t I see the
cup and see the table too? In the case of the
subject-object polarity, do we imagine or pro-
ject this relation? Is it a product of reflection
and memory? 
It seems to me that the F theorist should
say that it is somehow a product of higher cog-
nition that is projected onto normal adult hu-
man conscious experience. But if one is really
committed to the intuition that subjective char-
acter is an essential and hence ubiquitous fea-
ture  of  conscious  experience,  then  one  will
simply have to abandon self-relatum and self-
haecceity  accounts  as  characterizations  of  the
phenomenology (and as explanatory models, for
that matter). What we need is an account of
how it is that consciousness manifestly and non-
inferentially appears to have a relational struc-
ture even though one of the relata is, in a cer-
tain sense, invisible.
Here  the view that  consciousness  is  self-
manifesting  can  save  the  day.  An  episode  or
perhaps stream of consciousness, on this view,
appears to itself at every moment while other
things  appear  to  it  as  well.  This  will  require
more unpacking, but at present we just want to
clarify the putative phenomenological content of
the claim as best we can. We leave the notion of
appearing or  of  phenomenally  manifesting un-
defined. Or, if you prefer, we define it ostens-
ively by inner ostension and hope that our in-
terlocutors know what we are talking about and
have similar conscious minds (cf. Fales 1996, pp.
147–148).
Let’s say that phenomenal manifestation is
just  the  appearance  to/in  consciousness  of
something. Let’s leave it open what that some-
thing  is  (qualities,  facts,  objects).  We all  can
know what phenomenal manifestation is, in this
purely phenomenological  sense,  if  we are con-
scious and capable of normal reflection, atten-
tion, memory, and conceptual cognition. If  we
have tasted coffee, then the taste of coffee has
been  phenomenally  manifest  to  us.  If  we
haven’t, then it has not. And think of this gen-
erically—it’s what experiencing the taste of cof-
fee has in common with seeing the blue sky and
with  feeling  one’s  own  existence.27 Now,  the
claim is that an episode of consciousness is phe-
nomenally manifest to itself whenever anything
else is phenomenally manifest to/in that epis-
ode.  Whenever  anything  else  appears  to  con-
sciousness, that act or episode or stream of con-
sciousness appears to itself as well. And it is im-
portant to remember that this does not mean
that one is reflecting on one’s experience or that
one has any propositional attitude towards that
experience or that one is paying any attention
to that experience as such.
Now, let us suppose that this is the case.
Can we recover a notion of subjective character
from this in a way that accounts for both the
Humean intuition that the subject-relatum is, in
some  sense,  invisible  and  that,  nevertheless,
consciousness  has  a  subject-object  relational
structure  that  is  phenomenally  manifest  and
non-inferentially knowable? Yes, we can, and at
a relatively low price.
The subject-relatum, on the current pro-
posal, is just the episode of consciousness itself.
The episode appears to/in the episode. Other
things (qualities, objects, etc.) appear in/to the
episode as well. The episode is a unified whole,
the differentiated qualities and objects appear-
ing in/to it are like its parts (stressing “like”—
it’s an analogy).28 We do not find episodes that
do not have parts (except perhaps in some very
special  circumstances),  but  it  is  foolhardy  to
look for some special entity or haecceity that is
separable from all the other parts or like a part
among the parts. There is no such thing. And
that, arguably, is the sort of thing Hume was
failing to find. No such subject is given, hence
we don’t find it. Nonetheless, the true subject-
relatum, the episode of  consciousness itself,  is
not invisible. It is manifest. 
27 Cf. Moore (1910, p. 57). (This paper of Moore’s is not as well known
as his “Refutation of Idealism,” but it deserves to be.)
28 I will  not attempt to offer an account of the (synchronic or dia-
chronic) unity of consciousness in this paper (again, see e.g., Dainton
2000) or of mereological principles governing “parts” of episodes of
consciousness and episodes as “wholes.” It is enough for my purposes
that one recognize that conscious episodes are internally variegated
unities of some sort. 
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The  main  price  to  pay  here  is  that  we
must  try  to wrap our heads around the idea
that an episode of consciousness could be the
phenomenological subject of consciousness. I say,
and say truly, that such and such appears to
me or that I see, feel, hear, or am conscious of
such and such. If I am a subject of conscious-
ness and all subjects of consciousness are just so
many episodes,  then  am I  just  an episode  of
consciousness?! I’ve seen the incredulous stares
with my own eyes and have been told that the
sentence expressing the view that the subject of
consciousness is the episode of consciousness has
the same status as sentences like, “Pink dreams
sleep furiously.”
Indeed, this claim seems wildly counterin-
tuitive at first. But once we realize that there is
a certain temporal element connoted in our us-
age  of  “I,”  then this  can be  ameliorated.  “I”
normally refers not just to the present experi-
ence but to a whole history of connected experi-
ences and much else besides. So it would be a
mistake to infer from “I’ve seen the incredulous
stares” the claim that “Incredulous stares were
seen  in/by  this  current  episode  of  conscious-
ness.” Instead, in the spirit of Four Dimensional-
ism, one should translate thus: There was a past
series of conscious episodes suitably connected
to each other and to the present one; incredu-
lous stares were seen by/in them for some time;
and the episodes are being recalled in/by the
present conscious episode, which bears the same
relation (transitively conceived),  or some suit-
able  analogue  thereof,  in  the  case  of  broken
streams, to that sequence of earlier episodes. 
Note, however, that fundamentally the use
of “I” is anchored in moment-by-moment, self-
manifesting  conscious  experience.  Imagine  a
person with severe anterograde amnesia and ret-
rograde amnesia as well. Such a person might
think, from moment to moment, “I am seeing
this,” “I am feeling that,” but beyond a certain
perhaps necessary amount of working memory,
they may not carry any of that information into
their future. We can imagine truly minimal sub-
jects  that  have  only  the  minimal  amount  of
working  memory  required  for  consciousness,
supposing that some amount is required. On the
view  proposed  here,  such  a  conscious  being’s
consciousness would still have subjective charac-
ter. It would simply fail to be more or less auto-
matically  enriched  by  memory,  projection,  fa-
miliarity  with  one’s  body  and  dispositions,
autobiographical  idealizations  and  distortions,
etc., that is, by the autobiographical representa-
tional grid through which our experience is nor-
mally  spontaneously  filtered.  Perhaps  such  a
person could not think “I” in the sense in which
we normally think it. They may lack an “auto-
biographical  self”  and  even  “extended  con-
sciousness”, as Damasio would put it (see Dam-
asio 1999 and 2010). But their experience would
be  self-manifest  and  other  things  (“parts”)
would be manifest in/to that experience as well.
Still, isn’t it a bit too odd to hold that the
whole episode is conscious of its “parts”—how-
ever we end up construing these? Or that the
“parts”  are  phenomenally  manifest  to/in  the
whole they belong to? Doesn’t  this  still  seem
like a totally bizarre thing to say? We have to
remind ourselves that there is no thing in con-
sciousness,  no ego entity,  no homunculus that
these qualities could be manifest  to. We don’t
find any such thing; and no hidden thing could
allow  us  to  account  for  the  phenomenology.
However, we agreed (I hope) that consciousness
has  a  relational,  subject-object  structure  and
that this structure is itself phenomenally mani-
fest and not inferred. 
Another way to put it is to say that there
is a kind of contrast present in our experience
all the time. Something is before me, and it is
not me. Something is present to consciousness,
but  it  is  not  that  consciousness.  Given  our
mereological analogy, this contrast is a bit  like
that between a whole and its proper parts. The
whole is not a proper part. Yet, at a suitably
generic level, it bears the same relation to itself
that it bears to its constituents (everything is a
part of itself too, though an improper part).
Assuming that this relational structure is
not projected onto the experience in reflection,
assuming that is, that this is a genuine “prepre-
dicative”  structure  of  experience,  the  contrast
between the subject-pole and the object-pole is
manifest, even if it normally remains unthemat-
ized or attended to as such. On the hypothesis
that  consciousness  is  always  self-manifesting,
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there is no problem here. The relevant contrast
is like the contrast between the parts and their
unified  whole.  The  parts  are  manifest.  The
whole  is  manifest  (self-manifest).  So  all  the
needed elements are present for their relations
(of differentiation, unification, and inclusion) to
be manifest. 
Moreover,  the  idea  that  the  difference
between the parts and the whole is prepredicat-
ively manifest is no more implausible than the
idea that the difference between parts and other
parts is prepredicatively manifest, something al-
most no one would deny. If I see a red patch on
a black background, I have a differentiated, con-
trastive  visual  experience.  The  same  goes  for
differences between the sensory modalities:  we
see and hear simultaneously, etc. If those sorts
of contrasts can figure into the ground level of
experience,  why not the contrast between the
unified self-manifesting whole and all its mani-
fest  “parts”—the  totality  of  simultaneously
manifesting  qualities  (however  we  understand
them  exactly)  in  all  modalities  (sensory  and
possibly cognitive, conative, and affective)?
Subjective character then, on this view, is
just the self-manifesting character of an episode
of consciousness. This view has the nice feature
that it allows us to simultaneously account for
the  Humean-Buddhist  “no-substantial-self”  in-
tuition and the intuition of  relationality,  with
its attendant minimalist “sense of self”—as sub-
ject-pole.29 It does this with less metaphysical
cost than self-entity and self-haecceity theories,
even supposing that those theories are not en-
tirely  phenomenologically  implausible  and  ex-
planatorily bankrupt. Let’s remember, however,
that this is meant as a phenomenological claim
fundamentally:  consciousness  is  self-manifest
just as the unified totality of sensory qualities
(etc.) is manifest; and their contrast is manifest
too, just as the contrast between such qualities
(etc.) is manifest. This phenomenological claim
has an ontological significance only if we accept
that consciousness is indeed how it seems to be
upon reflection. A claim that I accept in this
case, but one need not accept it to appreciate
29 I defend this view also in Williford (2011a, 2011b) and in Williford
et al. (2012); Dreyfus (2011) is an articulation and defense of a sim-
ilar view from a Buddhist perspective. 
the phenomenological point and the virtues of
this way of articulating it. 
4 From self-representation to self-
acquaintance
I gave up on reductive self-representationalism
for quite general  reasons, reasons affecting all
representationalisms.  As  such,  one  might  be
tempted to suggest adopting some non-reduct-
ive form of S theory. For example, if one adopts
the phenomenal intentionality30 view, one might
hold that whatever phenomenal representation
is, consciousness represents itself in that way. It
seems like this view might be just another way
of describing the same phenomenological facts
belabored in the previous section. If that is so,
the  phrases  “phenomenal  intentionality”  and
“acquaintance”  are  going  to  be  basically  syn-
onymous, and the advocate of the former ter-
minology can just translate. If we build nothing
into the notion of representation other than the
idea that something (an object, property, epis-
ode of consciousness, or whatever) is phenomen-
ally manifest (to someone), then the views are
indistinguishable at the phenomenological level
and, maybe, the ontological level as well. 
If  this  is  not what is  intended, however,
then it is probably because the phenomenal in-
tentionality theorist wants to mark an import-
ant  distinction  between  intentionality  (repres-
entation) and acquaintance. Perhaps they would
prefer not to be committed to acquaintance if
possible,  and  there  are  several  reasons  they
might want to avoid such a commitment. But I
will argue that in a certain sense, to be plaus-
ible at all, all forms of representationalism, re-
ductive and non-reductive (including a phenom-
enal  intentionality-based  representationalism),
ought to embrace a type of acquaintance rela-
tion. 
Consider, for a moment, fictionalist repres-
entationalism  about  sensory  qualities  (projec-
tionism about colors, for example). One could
embrace a view according to which the sensory
qualities  are  phenomenally  manifest,  though
they  in  fact  are  never  really  instantiated  by
30 See e.g.,  Kriegel (2011) and the papers in  Kriegel (ed.) (2013), as
well as Kriegel’s excellent introduction to that volume.
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anything. In such a case, one would not want to
think of sensory phenomenal consciousness as a
matter of bearing a real acquaintance relation
to  such qualities  or  quality  instances.  Instead
one might prefer an adverbial construal of the
situation that avoids any commitment to any-
thing literally having (or perhaps even to there
being) the properties phenomenally represented.
On this view, one denies that there is a relation
that  supports  existential  quantification  over
these  immediate  objects  (whatever  they  are),
and one cannot conclude from the fact that one
is phenomenally conscious of a red patch that
there exists  a red patch of  which one is  con-
scious. 
Of course, this failure of existential quanti-
fication won’t apply in the case of one sort of ob-
ject, namely the conscious episode itself. But it
will not be because it is an object of phenomenal
intentionality that  one  can validly,  existentially
generalize from it; generally that fails, just as in
other  intentional  (and  intensional)  contexts.
Rather,  it  will  be because it  is  the subject  or
bearer of phenomenal intentionality that one can
validly generalize from it. In other words, we take
episodes of consciousness to be individuals that
have this pseudo-relational property. That is why
we can quantify over them, and not because of
anything that they pseudo-bear that pseudo-rela-
tion to. Such “objects,” after all, can be nonexist-
ent. Thomas Reid’s “ambulo ergo sum” would be
appropriate here, not the Cartesian  Cogito  con-
ceived in a phenomenologically performative way.
This situation is rather paradoxical. If the
only mode of awareness of our own consciousness
(even supposing ubiquitous self-manifestation) is
via phenomenal intentionality so construed, then
our evidence for the very existence of our own
consciousness is really no better than our evid-
ence for the existence of phenomenal colors. Just
as we might be persuaded that there really are no
phenomenal colors, perhaps we could become per-
suaded that there is no such thing as phenomenal
consciousness either. I regard this as absurd. It is
like saying that perhaps we only think we think,
or that perhaps it only appears to us that things
appear to us. Consequently, consciousness must
bear some evidentially relevant relation to itself
and to its own being, other than the phenomenal
intentionality pseudo-relation it  pseudo-bears  to
phenomenal colors. 
Thinking  of  consciousness  as  “being-ap-
peared-to-existingly”  does  not  help  here,  since
that applies to phenomenal colors and all other
perceived pseudo-objects and pseudo-qualities as
well. Any theorist committed to self-manifestation
should not try to construe this as just a case of
phenomenal intentionality as just described. From
our self-consciousness we can conclude that we do
exist, and this is not just because we know by in-
ference or  in some other  way that  we are the
bearer of a property, as in Reid’s  Ambulo.  We
must be acquainted with our own existence—in
the  sense  that  every  episode  of  consciousness,
however individuated, is acquainted with its own
existence. This applies to the subject-pole. What
about the object-pole?
In the context of the theory of perceptual
consciousness, I think it is a mistake to maintain
that any view according to which one can always
legitimately quantify over the “immediate objects
of  conscious  awareness”  is  committed either  to
some form of  direct realism (or perhaps a dis-
junctivist  version  thereof)  or  to  old-fashioned
sense-datum theory. Any plausible form of repres-
entationalism—fictionalist or realist, externalist or
internalist, reductive or non-reductive, is, I’ll ar-
gue,  committed  to  such  quantification,  though
this must be understood in a particular way. I am
not,  of  course,  saying that  if  we seem to con-
sciously visually perceive a pink rat then we can
infer  that  there exists  a  pink rat  that  we see.
There is, however, something other than just the
conscious state itself (qua whole) that we can le-
gitimately, existentially quantify over. 
Our conscious perception of differentiation
(in unity) entails,  even on a representationalist
view, that there exists something of which we are
aware,  namely,  at  the  least,  differentiation  (or
contrast) itself. For example, suppose I hallucin-
ate purple and pinkish smoke clouds arising from
stereo speakers as “Fairies Wear Boots” comes on.
Evidently  I  cannot  conclude  that  those  purple
and pinkish clouds exist. Still, I maintain, we can
conclude that there exists some differentiation or
contrast of which we are aware. By hypothesis, we
cannot say that the difference is that between the
pink smoke cloud and the purple one, since they
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do not exist. Differences between non-existent ob-
jects  cannot  be  appealed  to  in  order  to  make
sense of real differences.31 But we are aware of
some  real and phenomenally manifest differenti-
ation here. If we say no to that, we’d have to as-
sume that reflection is simply inaccurate when it
comes  to  such hallucinations;  that  we seem to
have  a  differentiated  experience  when  in  fact
there is no phenomenal difference at all. But if
that itself is a phenomenal state, say a conscious
reflection on an ongoing hallucination, we have
the same problem all over again. 
If the difference we are aware of is not and
is not to be accounted for by a difference in the
objects (since they do not exist), it must be a
matter  of  the difference  in  the representations.
Hence,  albeit  in an indirect manner and, as it
were, under the guise of a difference in the pink
and purple clouds, we must be aware of some dif-
ferentiation inherent in the representational states
themselves.32 If we reject disjunctivisms, then we
ought to maintain that in every case of differenti-
ated phenomenal awareness we are, in fact, ac-
quainted with (and not merely representing) the
differences inherent in our episodes of phenomenal
consciousness. This is, at any rate, what I think is
the most plausible account, even if the considera-
tions just given don’t absolutely clinch it. Again,
it is not that there cannot be some sort of repres-
entationalist response.33 It is, rather, that I regard
the line I take to involve fewer epicycles.
We cannot make good sense of the appear-
ance of  a phenomenal difference without direct
awareness of differentiation. But, by hypothesis,
31 We could possibly hold that even if the property instances are not
real, the universals represented are, and try to account for the differ-
ence in phenomenology in terms of those real differences. But this
sort of view does not allow us to make sense of the concrete but hal-
lucinatory representation of different particular instances of the dif-
ferent properties. 
32 I have briefly made similar arguments in Williford (2013).
33 In particular, a representationalist could say that the represented dif-
ference between the pink and purple clouds is just as hallucinatory
as the clouds themselves. This is, in a sense, correct. However, rep-
resentationalists hold (or ought to hold, anyway) that phenomenal
differences  always correlate  with differences  in the representations
themselves (and only normally in the objects of representation). If
there are phenomenal differences, there exist some differences inher-
ent in consciousness that are not merely the objects of representa-
tion. What I am claiming is that we are acquainted with this differ-
entiation under the guise of differences in objects represented. An
adherent of the Transparency Intuition would deny this, of course.
And I don’t take these considerations to constitute a knock-down ar-
gument. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this up.)
in the case of hallucination it cannot be that we
are aware of a real difference in the objects of rep-
resentation. Moreover, it cannot be a difference in
something that is  hidden from conscious aware-
ness—some difference in the externalist conditions
determining the content  of  the representational
states, for example—that we are aware of. The
most plausible candidate, then, is that we are dir-
ectly aware of (acquainted with) differentiation or
modifications in consciousness  itself  (and hence
the Transparency Intuition (see page 4) is, strictly
speaking, false; we are indeed aware of features of
consciousness itself even in so-called “first-order”
awareness).  This  applies  to  both reductive and
non-reductive forms of representationalism. If this
line of thought is correct, representationalist the-
ories really presuppose some sort of non-repres-
entationalist, acquaintance theory. 
Implicit in the above discussion is something
like this definition of acquaintance:
Acquaintance =Df (1) the relation (R) the
subject (s) of consciousness (i.e., the epis-
ode or stream itself) bears to the differen-
tiated  phenomenal  manifold  (D<x1,
x2….xn>),  such  that  (2)  if  sR[D<  x1,
x2….xn>],  then  we  may  infer  truly  that
( x)(sRx).∃
Of course, clause (2) can be taken as redundant,
given the usual understanding of real relations
and that the R of clause (1) is so taken. But in
this  context  it  is  important  to emphasize the
point. The first clause is just an inner-ostensive
phenomenological characterization that assumes
that the relational appearances are indeed the
reality; the second is a logico-ontological charac-
terization.  Importantly,  we  can  “quantify  in”
here:  If,  in  any  concrete  particular  case,  we
stand  in  that  relation  to  some  phenomenally
differentiated field, then we can truly infer that
there exists something differentiated we stand in
that relation to. However, it is in general  not
the represented (or intentional) objects that we
are thus acquainted with. It is, rather, the com-
mon factor of all episodes of phenomenal con-
sciousness,  be  they  hallucinations,  dreams,  or
the “perceptions” of brains in vats. This, again,
is often precisely what is denied when one says
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that a state is one of representation as opposed
to acquaintance. If it is true that I represent A,
I cannot infer from this that  there is some X
such  that  I  represent  X.  Adverbialisms  and
other forms of representationalism were, recall,
developed precisely around this insight in order
to overcome the problems of sense-datum and
other  relational  theories  of  perception.  Is  the
theory I am suggesting here a form of old-fash-
ioned sense-datum theory? 
Unfortunately I cannot give a short answer
to that question and can’t give all of the long
answer here. This will have to suffice: (1) We
can  regard  sensory  qualia  (or  hyle)  as  being
complex,  relational  properties  of  consciousness
(and  its  concrete  embodiment  in  brain  pro-
cesses); in fact, they could be something like ir-
resolvable  structural  properties  that  appear
simple precisely because they mark a limit of
our sensory resolution. (2) In order to flesh this
out, we must reject the Revelation Thesis—the
thesis  that  acquaintance  yields  up  all  of  the
properties of  sensory qualia.  In particular,  we
can (and should) reject the idea that acquaint-
ance tells us all of the categorial properties of
sensory qualities. There is no good reason to be-
lieve that it does. Hence, they could fail to seem
relational and yet still be relational. This is a
solution  to  the  “Grain  Problem”—a  problem
arising from the fact that brain properties are
“complex” and relational while sensory qualities
(phenomenal colors, tones) do not seem to be. If
we infer from the appearances then we cannot
consistently  hold  that  they  are  identical  to
brain properties. But we have no good reason
for making that inference.34 (3) It is not hard to
understand why the sensory qualities would be
integrated into a spatialized and “intentionally
animated” grid that can serve as a “user inter-
face”  for  us  to  deal  with  the  external  world,
yielding a “transparent” manifold in Metzinger’s
sense, a manifold we are built to systematically
and automatically “see right through”—causing
us to suffer  from a sort  of  delusion  of  direct
realism  (see  Williford et  al. 2012;  Williford
2013;  Metzinger 2004,  p.  163,  and  Revonsuo
34 I’ve argued this is in a bit more detail in Williford (2013). For relevant
background ideas see Williford (2005 and 2007). For a discussion of the
Revelation Thesis see e.g., Stoljar (2006, ch. 11) and Goff (forthcoming).
2006). Finally, (4) appeals to the “Transparency
Intuition”  (in  Tye’s  sense  of  “transparency”)
thus carry no serious weight. All the phenomen-
ological data in question are accounted for by
1–3,  and there  are  good  independent  lines  of
reasoning for each of these (that we do not have
time to go into here). 
I’ve  argued that  the  notion  of  acquaint-
ance, when interpreted in the rather minimal,
phenomenological,  and  logico-ontological  way
proposed, is the proper notion for characterizing
the relationship between consciousness and the
differentiated but unified multimodal experien-
tial manifold. Moreover, on the view proposed
here,  consciousness  bears  this  same  relation,
generically understood, to itself. 
If  the episode of consciousness bears the
relation to itself, then evidently there is some-
thing to which it bears that relation. But, non-
trivially,  we could not have the sort of  direct
evidence of its existence that we do have if con-
sciousness  were  not  self-acquainted—and  ac-
quainted with its own existence. And if the epis-
ode of consciousness bears the relation to the
differentiated manifold that constitutes the sur-
face that serves as its contact with a differenti-
ated reality beyond it—i.e., if it bears it to a
differentiated  portion  of  itself—then  there  is
something differentiated of which it is non-rep-
resentationally aware. One is directly aware of
the difference or differentiation even if one only,
strictly speaking, represents what the things so
differentiated happen to be or interprets them
as being such and such (mental, physical, sur-
faces of objects, internal sense data, quotidian
objects, etc.). In other words, I can see that red
is not blue even if I do not know what colors
are exactly, or if they are in physical space or
only in a virtual space in my brain. One does
not merely represent this difference or differenti-
ation. One is acquainted with oneself and with
the differentiation one contains. Of course, one
is also acquainted with the apparently intrinsic
properties that mark these internal differences,
but again, this need not mean that the proper-
ties  are  in  fact  non-relational  and  simple.  In
fine, we are self-acquainted and acquainted with
a  differentiated  manifold  and  thus,  at  some
level,  with  real  differences  in  the  mind,  the
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world, or world-mind boundary. 35 The acquaint-
ance  relation  consciousness  bears  to  itself  is,
generically speaking, identical to the relation it
bears  to  sensory  qualia  (or  hyle)—which  are
taken here as ultimately just transient modifica-
tions in the unfolding embodiment of conscious-
ness.  It  is  important  to  understand that  this
does not imply that there is a special type of
sensory quality (a “me-ish” quale) peculiar  to
consciousness.  It  is  as  diaphanous  as  G.E.
Moore said. Remember that the acquaintance in
an  instance  of  acquaintance  with  phenomenal
red is identical with the acquaintance in an in-
stance  of  acquaintance  with  phenomenal  C#,
even though phenomenal  red and C# are ut-
terly heterogeneous.
One might reasonably ask for a more sub-
stantive definition or account of acquaintance.
The  definition  given  relies  on  phenomenology
and logic and is otherwise quite empty. But this
is as it should be, in my view. Any further ac-
count of the nature of acquaintance, of what the
acquaintance  relation  is,  will  be  the  result  of
empirical  inquiry and a well-supported  a pos-
teriori identification.
5 Self-acquaintance, subjective 
character, and individuation 
Earlier I briefly noted that at the phenomenolo-
gical level we should probably not construe sub-
jective character fundamentally as a matter of
“mineness” or a “sense of self” where the latter
is thought of as a sense of oneself as an owner of
experiences. It is not that I do not think this
description contains a grain of truth; I do. The
worry, though, is that if we go this route, we
might  come to  the  conclusion  that  subjective
character involves acquaintance with a haecceity
—Zahavihood  and  Gallagherhood  once  again.
Here I want to consider the same issue from a
more ontologically oriented point of view.
We are indeed individuated and aware of
ourselves (something individuated). And we can
be aware of ourselves as distinct individuals and
owners. But this does not at all entail the doc-
trine of haecceities immediately present to con-
35 I have considered our acquaintance with a differentiated manifold
qua mind-world boundary in more detail in Williford (2013).
sciousness—for-me-ness or me-ishness as a spe-
cial property that no one else can share. Rather,
subjective character is a common form that all
conscious states have; but having this form does
not alone make something the individual it is,
evidently. It may be that in virtue of which we
can be aware of ourselves as individuals, but it
is not that in virtue of which we  are the indi-
viduals we are. Yes, there is a determinate indi-
vidual (somehow construed) that is acquainted
with itself. No, this does not necessarily mean
that  it  is  acquainted  with  that  in  virtue  of
which it  is  individuated.  That  could  be
whatever  it  is  that  individuates  physical  ob-
jects. Or, perhaps, nothing is metaphysically in-
dividuated by anything else. But it ought to be
clear  that  simply  in  being  aware  of  myself  I
need not be privy to anything non-trivial about
my metaphysical individuation conditions.36 
You  are  aware  of  your  consciousness  as
something individual. You are a self-aware indi-
vidual, if you prefer. But this does not mean that
your subjectivity consists in being directly aware
of what individuates you or the very property in
virtue of which you are the individual you are.
Or, perhaps, one may be aware of this property
or set of properties, but only in the guise of being
an individual that is thus and so. The “thus and
so”  part  (all  your  contingent  properties,  your
“facticity”) is radically changeable. You need not
have been thus and so. (You could have been a
contender! And if only you’d been rich!) You can
also be aware that you are a particular instance.
So, yes, you can become aware of your particular-
ity. But everybody is aware of their own particu-
larity. And it is, in a way, an empty and non-ma-
terial (in the “formal vs. material” sense) prop-
erty. It’s not as if my particularity has a special
something that yours lacks and vice versa. Hence,
I would not be able to tell, by phenomenological
intuition alone (or in any other way for that mat-
ter), which of the infinitely many duplicate and
near-duplicate worlds I am in (cf. Elga 2004). Am
I in the world in which one of Napoleon’s buttons
had a bit of his blood on them the morning of the
Battle of Jena or in the world in which that was
36 I have briefly argued this before in Williford (2011b). I was pleased
to find that a similar line of argument was pursued by the eleventh-
century Buddhist philosopher Ratnakīrti; see Ganeri (2012, p. 217).
Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 16 | 27
www.open-mind.net
not the case? I cannot tell by introspection, yet,
depending on the correct answer, I am one type
of  individual  (and of  course,  one token of  un-
countably  many  of  that  type)  and  not  of  the
other type (which type also contains uncountably
many individual counterparts of mine). I am indi-
viduated, and I know that; I belong to just one of
these worlds. But I do not have complete access
to my individuation conditions or the conditions,
if there are any, that determine that this indi-
vidual is in one world as opposed to another. I
have uncountably many counterparts who feel ex-
actly  the  same  way because,  to  speak  loosely,
they don’t know that they are not me; none of us
can tell the difference. I cannot locate my Home-
world on the map of worlds that contains my rel-
evant counterparts. 
It  is  a  mistake,  then,  to  make subjective
character  depend on the sense of  individuality;
this reverses the proper order of explanation. Self-
acquaintance and concrete instantiation yield the
sense of individuality, and they do it again and
again in many places and in the same way. Evid-
ently, the contingent filling that experience and
history infuse into the formal shell of conscious
subjectivity is  not relevant at the level we are
concerned with. Hence, it can also be metaphysic-
ally,  not just phenomenologically,  misleading to
use terms like “for-me-ness,” “mineness,” “me-ish-
ness,”  etc.  That is  to  make something  derived
seem like something basic. The basic things are
self-acquaintance (“reflexivity”) and actual, con-
crete instantiation or constitution. The sense of
individuality comes from these, not the other way
around. 
Of course, if you are a real, concrete indi-
vidual, you are individuated. But individuation is
evidently  not  self-acquaintance.  The  latter  is,
however, required if one is to get the sense of be-
ing an individual, to know, feel, and be concerned
with  oneself  as an  individual.  If  we  generally
equated self-acquaintance with something’s being
the individual it is, then we’d have to hold either
that every individuated thing in  the cosmos is
self-acquainted and conscious, or that conscious
things have one type of  metaphysical individu-
ation  conditions,  and  non-conscious  things  an-
other,  for  very  obscure  reasons.  Moreover,  we
either must not take subjective character to be a
univocal notion or must resort to some sort of
hopeful brute resemblance nominalism about sub-
jective character and maintain that we cannot not
really know that, say, I,  qua subject, am in any
meaningful sense like you, qua subject. This is not
a very good dilemma to be in.37 I think the more
plausible view is that self-acquaintance is not the
source of the individuation of consciousness but
rather  something  that  both  concretely  depends
upon individuation and enables the knowledge of
individuality  and,  consequently,  self-location  in
surrounding spaces.
It is misleading, then, both phenomenologic-
ally and ontologically to refer to subjective char-
acter principally as “mineness” or “me-ishness” or
“for-me-ness,” even though subjective character is
one of the bases of the sense of individuality. We
should not think of self-acquaintance (and sub-
jective character) as anything more than this rela-
tion all episodes of consciousness bear to them-
selves. It is a perfectly uniform structure and a
kind of universal—in that sense, supposing one is
some sort of realist about universals, there is in-
deed some identical thing that unifies all episodes
(or subjects)  of  consciousness,  namely the very
property of being self-manifesting; but we are all
distinct  instances.  Thus,  in  a very special  and
non-Vedantist sense, we could say that there are
many  instances  of  consciousness  but  only  one
subject,  with some instances connected to each
other and grouped together in other important
ways as well. But there is no substantial self. In
this  regard,  I  am  with  Hume,  Sartre,  Parfit,
Strawson,  Metzinger,  the  Buddhists,  and  other
“non-egological” theorists of consciousness. Note
that this does not mean that consciousness is “an-
onymous”  in  the  sense  of  “subjectless.”  Every
stream of consciousness has its transient subject
(viz., itself) but that is not a substantial self. 
6 Self-acquaintance, intrinsic properties, 
and physicalism
Should we really regard self-acquaintance as a
relational matter? Is it really a matter of some
37 Previous episodes of consciousness normally connected to the present
episodes (the ones producing this document) found themselves trying
to live with the latter horn of the dilemma in the flawed  Williford
(2005).
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sort of thing standing in a relation to itself? On
the one hand, there is no special problem either
logically  or  phenomenologically  speaking  with
the idea of something relating to itself in this
way. Appearance is appearance-to. That’s rela-
tional. There is no  a priori reason why some-
thing could not appear to itself. It does not lead
to a regress.38 One should put aside misleading
and  question-begging  spatial  analogies—con-
sciousness is not like a knife trying to cut itself.
Advocates  of  self-acquaintance  will  claim,  op-
posing one analogy with another, that it is more
like a candle’s flame illuminating itself by emis-
sion while it illuminates other things by the re-
flection of its light; it does not require another
candle flame for it to be illumined.39 Moreover,
one must remember to exclude from one’s mind
the sort of objectification and description-based
cognition  that  normally  overlays  the  phenom-
enal manifold. We are talking about the sphere
of  immanence,  to  speak  Husserlian,  and  not
about  intentional  objects  or  constituted  ob-
jectivities  given  via  Abschattungen.  Again,  we
are talking about immediate self-acquaintance,
not the representation of oneself as being such
and such. It is indeed more like the emission of
light than the reflection of light, if we must pick
an analogy.
Nevertheless,  even if  we accept  the  rela-
tional construal and remember that it is an im-
mediate  and  direct  relation  not  mediated  by
concepts or descriptions, we still have a prob-
lem. It is not as if conscious episodes just hap-
pen to be self-manifesting. The property of be-
ing  self-manifesting  is  not  something  that  a
thing can have and then not have—like chan-
ging coats of paint. It is of the very essence of a
conscious episode. This is not an external rela-
tion to itself or one mediated by convention or
history or  anything else.  Hence,  it  must  have
some  set  of  intrinsic  properties  in  virtue  of
which it  is  self-manifesting.  Thus,  the Heidel-
berg School, Michel Henry, and Dan Zahavi, I’ll
38 This is  demonstrable. First, obviously, there is no logical problem
with reflexive relations. Second, it requires special and highly ques-
tionable  premises  to  generate  another  regress  here.  See  Williford
(2006). See also Kriegel (2009, p. 124) and Janzen (2008, p. 110). 
39 The knife blade and candle flame competing analogies loom large in
the Indo-Tibetan debate on this issue. Clearly, the analogies will be
found, by opponents and proponents, to be exactly as plausible as
the views they encode.
concede,  win on this  ontological  point.  Dieter
Henrich,  Manfred  Frank,  Henry,  and  Zahavi
have  all  maintained  that  self-manifestation
could not be a relational matter (e.g.,  Henrich
1971,  1982;  Frank 2002,  2007;  Zahavi 1999;
Henry 1973). And they are very close to being
right. I think, however, that it is more accurate
to say that even if it is a relational matter, it is
not an external relation we are dealing with. So
there  must  be  something  about  the  internal
structure of consciousness that grounds the rela-
tion. In short, as Henrich and Frank have long
said, there must be some intrinsic property in
virtue of which episodes of consciousness (out of
all other things in the world) are self-manifest-
ing. What could this property be? Are we left
with  something  that  cannot  be  physical,  or,
even if it is physical, is nevertheless irreducible
in some sense?
It may seem now that David Rosenthal is
having his revenge.40 In effect, I have been ar-
guing against the extrinsicalist view—the view
that something’s being conscious has to do with
external relations the thing stands in—be those
external relations to other mental states or ex-
ternal relations to historically distant states of
affairs or to other parts of one’s cognitive ap-
paratus. Now, to our chagrin, it seems we are
left with something explanatorily basic. At this
point  we  are  left  with  two  problematic
strategies.  We could go the panpsychist  route
(Strawson 2006): It’s no surprise that we’re con-
scious if everything is! Or if, as I do, one thinks
(after Locke in a similar context) that “every
sleepy nod doth refute” this, we can hold that
only certain physical complexes instantiate this
particular property (or set of properties). This
will mean either some form of property dualism
or some form of identity theory (possibly with
its “Harder Problem”; see  Block 2002). If  one
does not want to be a dualist or a panpsychist,
what can be said?
Here is  the  sort  of  approach that  seems
most attractive (to me, anyway). We want to
hold that consciousness is indeed some sort of
physical process. It’s not, however, just a mat-
ter of the satisfaction of some functional role. I
40 Though even Rosenthal’s own view was pushed into being (or always
was) problematic in this regard, as noted above.
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think it also has a functional role. But it is not
in virtue of playing that role that something is
consciousness;  rather,  consciousness  is  suitable
for that role because of its properties.41 In prin-
ciple, many different things could play that role
(at least if we specify it entirely in behavioral
terms). Or, at least, this is an open question.
Consciousness  has  a  functional  role,  but  it  is
not to be identified with just any arrangement
of elements that can play that role as causally
and behaviorally specified. There is some spe-
cial,  distinctive  physical  process  that  is  con-
sciousness. It plays its functional role in virtue
of its having the properties it does and not vice
versa. But then does some version of Russellian
Monism start to seem attractive (see e.g., Stol-
jar 2006, ch. 6 and Pereboom 2011, chs. 5 and
6)? Am I saying that the functional role is just
being  (contingently)  satisfied  by  a  (somehow)
unified and self-manifesting group of qualia? Or
something wild like that? 
Here  we  play  the  same  sort  of  trick  we
played  when  dealing  with  the  Grain  Problem.
Consciousness is self-acquainted, but we are also,
as  Fumerton  and  Fales  would  say,  acquainted
with  acquaintance;  we  are  given  givenness
(Fumerton 1985, pp. 57–58 and  Fales 1996, pp.
147–148). The relation does not seem complex or
to  involve  many layers  of  relational  structures.
But we cannot infer from this appearance that it
is in fact such a simple relation. Again, its not
seeming complex does not, without controversial
and implausible completeness assumptions, entail
its being simple. Moreover, once we realize that
normal consciousness involves a great many in-
tricately  related  aspects—at  least  (non-contin-
gently) differentiated unity and temporality, and
(contingently) animation functions operating on a
differentiated sensory manifold, iterations of these
functions, pattern extractions, etc.—we have all
the more reason to suppose that there is complic-
ated  machinery  hidden  from  our  introspective
view. In fact, it will be noted in a Sartrean and
Moorean  vein,  that  consciousness,  both  as  ac-
quaintance  relation  and  subject-relatum,  seems
mightily empty. Once we realize that Revelation
theses fail, then we no longer need read this ap-
41 Here I am in considerable agreement with  Langsam (2011, ch.
3).
pearance as “consciousness qua acquaintance rela-
tion appears simple.” Rather, we read it as “con-
sciousness qua acquaintance relation does not ap-
pear complex.”  These are,  in  many cases,  phe-
nomenologically  indistinguishable,  but  they  are
logically  different.42 The  first  reading,  coupled
with an infallibility thesis (or with just a strong
presumption in favor of the deliverances of naïve
introspection), leads to the view that acquaint-
ance is simple. But the other requires a Revela-
tion (or completeness) thesis to get the same res-
ult. Revelation is, again, totally implausible. And
even if we were to assume infallibility, we have no
a priori reason to favor one interpretation of the
phenomenological  data  over  the  other—the
“seeming non-P” vs.  “not seeming P” formula-
tion. We do, however, have plenty of a posteriori
inductive reasons for preferring the latter: It does
not seem complex, but it is (or at least could be
for all we can tell phenomenologically).
Since we have an extremely limited resol-
ution when it  comes to penetrating into the
nature  of  consciousness  by  introspective
means,  we  are  quite  free  to  adopt  another
strategy. We can accept an  a posteriori iden-
tity theory. Consciousness is identical to some
sort of recurrent physical process unfolding in
the brain.  Fundamentally,  what  we get  from
introspection is a sort of structure and some
irresolvables—the  sensory  qualities—that  are
like reflections of  the materials in which the
form  or  structure  is  instantiated.  Since  we
have  rejected  Revelation  (completeness)
theses,  we  can  accept  that  sensory  qualities
(and the acquaintance relation itself) are com-
plex  and  involve  layers  of  relations  even
though they do not seem this way (just as the
headless woman43 in the famous illusion does
not seem to have a head—absence of appear-
ance is transformed into the appearance of an
absence; see Armstrong 1968 and 1973). 
42 They are phenomenologically indistinguishable in the way that the
stream of consciousness’s being temporally continuous is, plausibly,
phenomenologically  indistinguishable  from  consciousness’s  being
punctate or discrete, or in the way in which consciousness’s seeming
free from causal determination is phenomenologically indistinguish-
able from its simply not seeming determined (because the causal re-
lations are inaccessible, as Spinoza suggested).
43 See the following links:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXOqD5B5Sxc
http://www.deceptology.com/2010/10/headless-woman-illusion.html 
Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 19 | 27
www.open-mind.net
We can use what structure we are aware
of, however, to build models to guide our search
for the neural correlates of consciousness. One
thing  we  see  is  that  the  (only  apparently
simple)  acquaintance  relation  involved  is  such
that whenever xRy, xRx; while it is not the case
that if xRy, then yRy (in the case where y is a
sensory  quality  or  manifold  thereof).  And  we
have  some  idea  of  what  the  qualities  in  the
manifold could be—e.g., limits of resolution or
irresolvables operated on by a spatializing filter.
We can also see that spatial projection, integra-
tion  of  multimodal  information,  temporality,
and  the  modulation  of  attention  are  involved
(along,  of  course,  with  more  advanced  things
like  intentional  animation,  cognitive  filtering
and reprocessing, and poise for action). We have
a self-manifesting totality containing a unified
and  spatialized  but  differentiated  manifold.
Consequently, we do need to look for processes
that can do information integration and bind-
ing, but that is  only necessary, not sufficient.
We need to look as well at processes that spa-
tialize  the  multimodal  (and  multidimensional)
information (see Williford et al. 2012). 
This does not at all mean we are looking
for a little room in the brain that has patches of
red, yellow, blue, and green mental paint in it.
Rather we must look for more abstract corres-
pondences. In the case of the sensory qualities,
we  are  possibly  looking  for  higher-order  rela-
tions between fairly complex structures, struc-
tures  that  can transiently  be  pulled into and
“rendered” by the core process. Basically, this
panoply  of  contrast-related  irresolvables  gets
generated in a real-time and transient fashion,
now occupying this virtual “location”, now oc-
cupying that, depending on a whole host of in-
put factors (head orientation, background, con-
ceptualization,  etc.).  These  “locations”  map
onto (we hope) real physical space at a certain
scale, but it is not a matter of finding a “bubble
within a bubble.” It is a matter of an abstract
correlation of structure. The isomorphisms (or
homomorphisms) could be there even if the in-
ternal “space” of experience is entirely virtual, a
kind of computational “movie in the brain” to
use another phrase of Damasio’s. Assuming the
principle that the positive and critically evalu-
ated set of phenomenological descriptions gives
us not  just  the way consciousness  seems,  but
the way it  in fact is,  along with our identity
postulate, we can be sure that something in the
brain has a structure corresponding to this, no
matter how transformed by “layers of abstrac-
tion” it may be.
What  is  more,  self-acquaintance  will  de-
mand that we explore models in which real re-
flexivity can be encoded. Hofstadter’s model is
one  of  these.44 But  following D.  Rudrauf  and
further  encouraged  by  D.  Bennequin,  I  have
moved in the direction of considering projective
geometrical models. There is no space to go into
this here, but suffice it to say that there exist
mathematical frameworks that allow us to con-
ceptualize and investigate more deeply the self-
acquaintance-related  features  of  consciousness
by  considering  the  interplay  of  the  space  we
project  and  the  origin  of  the  projection  (see
Williford et al. 2012 and Rudrauf et al. ms). 
The goal of such work would be the refine-
ment of mathematical models of the structure
of consciousness. Upon the achievement of that
end, we would then try to determine how such
models could possibly be physically realized in
the brain. Once we can say what the physically
detectable signatures of such a realization might
be,  then  we  could  one  day  meaningfully  test
such theories. Were we to verify the existence of
such a structured process in the brain, explain-
ing  consciousness  would  reduce  to  explaining
how the process is realized—what parts have to
be in what order doing what and at what time
scale.
It will always seem to be a brute fact, at
some level, that consciousness is physical pro-
cess  X,  however  X gets fleshed out. But we’ll
just  get  used to it,  as  long as  there  is  some
somewhat  intelligible  bridge  (in  this  case
provided  by  mathematical  models)  from  the
lived phenomenon to its brain correlate. We’ll
get used to it just as we’ve gotten used to water
being H2O. It could be that there will be mul-
tiple  ways to implement such a process.  Sup-
44 While Hofstadter’s Gödel-inspired model might be problematic (both
in  terms  of  physical  implementation  and  in  terms  of  the  strong
mathematical  realism  it  might  presuppose),  it  is  certainly  in  the
right  class  of  models  we  should  be  considering.  See  Hofstadter
(2007). 
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pose, just for example, that it has to do with
generating certain types of fields and that mul-
tiple  substrates,  not  just  brains,  can generate
and support the relevant sorts of fields.  Then
consciousness will be, to that degree, multiply
realizable. Suppose it is a matter of realizing a
certain computational organization. Then, in ef-
fect,  implementing  a  certain  program will  be
equivalent to being conscious; and if machines
made from different substrates or with different
architectures  can  run the  program,  conscious-
ness will be multiply realizable in the sense of
computational  functionalism.  Your  particular
consciousness  then,  as  you  know and  love  it,
would be just the concrete running of the pro-
gram in your particular brain. 
We might wonder, in such a case, what it
is  to “run” a program or to “have” a certain
structure or to “instantiate” such an arrange-
ment or system of fields or whatever. Of course,
this  is  a  quite  general  metaphysical  problem
that we should not confuse with any problem
specific  to  consciousness.  However,  given  that
we are acquainted with our own individual ex-
istence, it seems that somehow its instantiation
makes its very instantiation available or mani-
fest in some non-representational way. This is
rather peculiar. If we are going to be physical-
ists who are nonetheless responsible to the phe-
nomenology, however, this is what we have to
accept, or so I have argued. Something is con-
scious if it has a certain internal structure and
attendant dynamical profile. Being conscious is
having that structure and profile. We will never
be able to explain why that is the case because
it is simply a confusion to think that identities
like this admit of explanation; they can only be
discovered (Papineau 2002, ch. 3). We must, of
course,  give  evidence  in  favor  of  the  relevant
identity claim; uncovering such evidence is the
goal of scientific research on consciousness. Our
choice is between this sort of view and the view
that  there  is  something  else,  something  non-
physical that  just  is consciousness.  Of  course,
we’d never be able to explain why that is the
case either. So in the absence of compelling ar-
guments for dualism or panpsychism, Occam’s
Razor would lead us, as Smart pointed out so
long ago, to embrace an identity theory. 
The identity theory only adumbrated here
would be neither a crude type-type identity the-
ory nor a causal-role functionalist  token-token
identity theory where the realizers do not mat-
ter at all. Since any concrete consciousness is a
marriage of form and matter (and the self-ap-
pearance of that marriage), and since there no
doubt are physical constraints on what sorts of
materials can be put into that form, we want to
identify  consciousness  with  neither  a  specific
type  of  material  (or  “wonder  tissue”  in  Den-
nett’s phrase) nor with an abstract, disembod-
ied form that seems trivially realizable by prac-
tically  any  set  of  elements—since  purely  ab-
stract isomorphisms may be a dime a dozen.45
In other words, we need a non-eliminativist and
non-idealist account of what it is to really real-
ize a structure,  instantiate a form, or,  as  the
case may be, to  really run a program or com-
pute a function. To my knowledge, no one cur-
rently has such an account. 
At bottom, this is just the old metaphys-
ical problem of the Methexis—the relation of
universals to particulars or of form to matter.
When I am feeling optimistic, I imagine that
I’ve reduced the problem of consciousness to
another, more general (as well as ancient and
probably insoluble) metaphysical problem. We
may not know what it is for matter to really
and  mind-independently  take  on  a  certain
form,  but  it  is  hardly  an  implausible  meta-
physics that says that this happens. It is argu-
ably  this  type  of  metaphysical  view  that
would  best  explain  the  success  of  applied
mathematics,  engineering,  and  the  sciences:
they  are  successful  because  the  world  really
does have (or approximate) the relevant math-
ematical structures—these are in re structural
universals. This seems to be a commitment of
scientific  realism. But perhaps  we will  never
get  beyond  a  rather  crude  operationalism
when we empirically investigate such matters;
perhaps the metaphysical  nature of  property
instantiation will forever remain obscure to us.
That should not, however, discourage us from
carrying  on  such  empirical  investigations  in
the case of consciousness. Even if there will be
45 For  discussion,  see  Chalmers (1996) and  Buechner (2008,  ch.
3).
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a residual metaphysical mystery,  it  is  a gen-
eral one, not one specific to consciousness.
The main point here, and the concluding
one,  is  that  consciousness  could  be  self-ac-
quainted,  where  this  is  not  a  matter  of  ex-
ternal relations, and still some form of relat-
ively  non-mysterious  (hylomorphic)  physical-
ism could be true. One might balk at the idea
that this would not be a matter of external re-
lations, especially if we go the computational
functionalist route. But think of it like this: If
we  are  realists  about  the  implementation  of
computational  structures,  then  even  though
the  structures  involve  parts  and  elements,
there is still a unity to the pattern as imple-
mented. It is, in a certain sense, an indivisible
whole that is not just the mereological sum of
its parts. Analogously, the circle has its own
structure  and  characteristic  properties  even
though it is made of points.  What we really
need, and may never have (but who knows?)
is a theory that tells us when we have a real,
concrete  unified  whole,  (where  this  is  not
simply a functional or conventional character-
ization but is a matter of more basic physical
relations)  and  when  we  have  unities  and
wholes  (and  instantiations  of  structures  and
properties) that are only conventionally real. 
Suppose  then  that  we  adopt  a  sort  of
realism  about  computational  (or  otherwise
structural) wholes, which we have some inde-
pendent reason to do. Circles have remarkable
properties,  qua circles, even if they are made
up of points. Concrete circular things approx-
imate these. Simultaneous cycles have certain
number-theoretic properties just qua cycles re-
gardless of what they are cycles of (e.g., repro-
ducing  cicadas  and  cicada  predators,  see
Baker 2005). Likewise, for the concrete imple-
mentation  of  consciousness,  it  is  surely  the
case that certain elements must be put into a
certain arrangement, realizing a certain struc-
ture  and  dynamics.  This  would  not  mean,
however,  that consciousness  as such is  to be
identified with either those elements or the ar-
rangement  abstractly  conceived.  Rather  it  is
the  concretely  implemented organization  of
those elements  qua whole.  In virtue of being
an instance of that form or structure, it has
certain properties. One of these could be the
property of being self-manifesting. That prop-
erty could itself be a complex relational prop-
erty  having  a  certain  unity.  The  account
sketched  here  presupposes  a  certain  realism
about the instantiations of mathematical and
computational  structures—that  there  are  de-
terminate, mind-independent facts of the mat-
ter about this. We cannot go further into this
rather  large  and  complicated  metaphysical
hornet’s nest. Suffice it to say that a real, uni-
fied,  concretely  instantiated  structure  could,
in a certain sense, be relational and have com-
ponents even if it is, in another sense, an in-
trinsic property.
7 Conclusion
I have argued that the best way to character-
ize subjective character is in terms of self-ac-
quaintance  and  not,  for  various  reasons,  in
terms of  Higher-Order,  Same-Order,  or Priv-
ileged-Object  representation.  I  argued  that
every episode or stream of consciousness is ac-
quainted  with  itself,  and  not  with  a  self  in
some  other  sense—a  homunculus,  substance,
or haecceity. This is, I maintain, the best way
to make sense of the intuition of subject-ob-
ject  polarity  and the  Humean intuition  that
we do not  find a self-entity.  Moreover,  one’s
sense of being an individual is a consequence
of  self-acquaintance  and  concrete  existence
and not to be conflated with subjective char-
acter as such. Such conflation leads to poten-
tially  misleading  descriptions  of  subjective
character (as “mineness”) and, if taken liter-
ally,  to  metaphysically  and  epistemologically
undesirable consequences. We are individuated
and self-acquainted, and that is enough to al-
low us  to  derive  the  sense  of  self  or  “mine-
ness”; but self-acquaintance is not itself what
individuates us,  nor does it necessarily make
us aware of what does. 
Nevertheless,  I  conceded  to  Henrich,
Frank, Henry, and Zahavi (among others) that
consciousness must have some intrinsic (or in-
ternal relational) property in virtue of which
it  is  self-acquainted.  But  I  argued  that  this
does  not  nullify  the  appropriateness  of  de-
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scribing subjective character as being a matter
of a very complex relation, though it does not
seem to be so complex. 
Finally,  I  argued  that  the  position  ad-
vanced here is not incompatible with a form of
(hylomorphic) physicalism. Sensory hyle, the ac-
quaintance  relation  itself,  the  self-manifesting
episodes, could all be brain processes and prop-
erties. On the phenomenological side, this gains
plausibility  once we take to heart  the incom-
pleteness of introspection (and of pre-reflective
self-awareness  as  well):  not  seeming  complex
and relational does not entail not being complex
and relational. On the ontological side, I argued
that even some form of computational function-
alism could be true. But, generally, the import-
ant thing to remember is that consciousness is
the marriage of form and matter. It cannot be
simply equated with either. This opens up space
for multiple realizability, but it might also mean
that not just any old substrate will do. It’s an
open question.  The  metaphysical  commitment
behind this position is just some form of realism
about structural universals and their mind-inde-
pendent instantiation conditions, which is argu-
ably a commitment of scientific realism in any
case. Absent dualism, panpsychism, or idealism,
that is what we will have to accept, I believe.
(Eliminativism is, of course, a non-starter.)
We do not  need a theory of  the Meth-
exis, however, in order to attempt to find the
neural  correlates  (correlation conceived of  as
indicating  identity  here)  of  consciousness  by
building  mathematical  models  of  the  phe-
nomenology  and  figuring  out  how  the  brain
might  implement  the  structures  so  modeled.
In fact, just such an approach is quite in line
with  scientific  practice  generally:  We  know
that the world we investigate with our relat-
ively crude means is, in multiple ways, a play
of matter and form even if  we do not really
know  what  the  Matter  ultimately  is,  what
Forms are, and how the latter come to live in
the former. 
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